

PREVENTING VIOLENT STREET CRIME IN STOCKTON, CALIFORNIA

A Report to the Stockton Police Department

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Introduction

In 2004, the City of Stockton was identified as the most violent city in California with a rate of 1,362 violent crimes per 100,000 residents.¹ A recent 2005 analysis by the Stockton Police Department (SPD) revealed that Stockton remained the most violent city in California with a violent crime rate of 1,503 (10.4% increase over the previous year). The high violent crime rate has generated considerable concern among Stockton city leaders and residents.² A number of factors, such as poverty, lack of education, unemployment, overcrowded jails, illegal drug use, and gangs, have been identified as important contributors to Stockton's violent crime problem.³ In August 2005, the Mayor launched a Crime Suppression Initiative that included a series of innovative police strategies to reduce violence and established a Blue Ribbon Crime Prevention Committee to examine issues related to Stockton violence and make recommendations regarding community crime prevention.⁴

The City of Stockton hired the author to examine the nature of violent street crime in the city, review the violence prevention activities of the SPD, and make recommendations on improving the police department's response to violent street crime problems. Like other cities, violent crime in Stockton is highly concentrated among a small number of "hot spot" locations and highly-active gang-involved offenders. The SPD has developed a series of violent crime reduction responses that are based on

¹ Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Reports data were used to determine 2004 violent crime rates for Stockton and other U.S. cities. These data are available from the Bureau of Justice Statistics at <http://bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/dataonline/>

² Ioffee, K. (2005) Stockton Crime Tops S.F., L.A. *The Record*, July 21; Fitzgerald, M. (2005) Crime is on Readers' Minds. *The Record*, August 1.

³ Fitzgerald, M. (2005) Solution to Crime Lies Beyond Jail. *The Record*, July 29; Ioffee, K. (2006) Struggle for the Streets. *The Record*, April 23; Ioffee, K. (2006) Experts Say Many Factors Draw Youths to Gangs. *The Record*, April 23.

⁴ Fitzgerald, M. (2005) Council Has Right Idea in Crime Fight. *The Record*, August 21.

national existing best practices for strategic crime prevention. The command staff and line-level officers have been earnest in their efforts to maximize their ability to prevent violence despite very limited resources and persistent urban problems, such as poverty, drug abuse, and an overcrowded criminal justice system. While this review has identified several opportunities to adjust existing programs and maximize interagency and community-based partnerships, the general violence prevention approach of the Stockton Police is sound. To avoid the uncertainty and short-term inertia sometimes associated with leadership changes, the City of Stockton should keep the existing SPD management team and provide additional resources to bolster the ability of the police department to adjust and deliver meaningful responses to violent street crime.

The key recommendations of this review are as follows:

Recommendation 1: The City of Stockton needs to increase the number of authorized Stockton Police officers to bring the average ratio of full-time sworn officers closer to the ratio of police departments serving jurisdictions with similar population sizes. In hiring these officers, it will be necessary to increase the number of support staff and supervisory positions. A hiring plan must be developed to bring the number of SPD officers and civilian staff in line with the staffing levels of other departments.

Recommendation 2: Until additional officers are hired, the City of Stockton should appropriate funds to maintain the hot spots policing program at its original levels.

Recommendation 3: The Stockton Police Department should continue to focus on hot RDs by maintaining an increased presence and community problem-oriented policing. Until additional funds are available or additional officers are hired, a deployment plan needs to be developed that maximizes the ability of Stockton Police officers to maintain short-term crime prevention gains in targeted neighborhoods.

Recommendation 4: The number of officers dedicated to preventing gang violence should be expanded. In the short term, the SPD may want to consider combining the GVSU and GSET units. The mission of the gang unit should more closely adhere to an approach that combines enforcement, prevention, and intervention activities to proactively prevent gang violence. Collecting and analyzing intelligence

and crime data must be an important component of gang violence prevention efforts.

Recommendation 5: The Operation Peacekeeper initiative must be reinvigorated.

Recommendation 6: The City of Stockton needs to hire additional gang outreach workers to provide gang-involved youth and their families with opportunities and services.

The Nature of Violent Crime in Stockton, California

Violent Crime Rates in Stockton and Other California and U.S. Cities, 2004

While the violent crime rate is higher than other California cities, it is important to recognize that Stockton is far from the most violent city in the United States. Stockton also does not have the highest homicide, robbery, or rape rates in California. In 2004, Stockton's violent crime rate (1,362.0) was ranked 20th among all law enforcement agencies reporting crime data for jurisdictions with populations of 100,000 or greater to the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports. The violent crime rates of St. Louis (MO) (2,057.9), Flint (MI) (1,925.7), Atlanta (GA) (1,842.0), Baltimore (MD) (1,839.4), and Springfield (MA) (1,824.0) were notably higher. In terms of homicide rates, Stockton, with 14.6 homicides per 100,000 residents, was ranked 6th in California and 40th in the United States. Homicide rates were higher among the California cities of Richmond (34.8), San Bernardino (25.3), Inglewood (22.3), Oakland (20.6), and Los Angeles County (16.2). Stockton's homicide rate seems modest in comparison to cities such as New Orleans (LA) (56.0), Gary (IN) (53.7), Richmond (VA) (47.3), Baltimore (MD) (43.5), and Detroit (MI) (42.1).

Stockton has relatively low forcible rape rates (39.3) and is ranked 15th in California, far behind the top cities of Oakland (64.9), Santa Rosa (63.2), and Ontario (52.0). Stockton's robbery rate (432.3) is the fourth highest in California behind Oakland (542.8), San Bernardino (485.3), and Richmond (483.1). Stockton is ranked 36th among US cities for robbery rates. The top US cities for robbery include St. Louis (MO) (785.3), Cincinnati (OH) (756.3), Atlanta (GA) (724.5), Cleveland (OH) (711.5), and Hartford (CT) (711.4). Unfortunately, Stockton has the highest aggravated assault rate in California with 861.3 per 100,000 residents, but is only ranked 19th among US cities. Cities with higher aggravated assault rates include Flint (MI) (1,385.5), Springfield (MA) (1,271.8), Miami Gardens (FL) (1,262.6), St. Louis (MO) (1,205.8), and Orlando (FL) (1,182.3).

Violent Crime Trends in Stockton, 1985 - 2005

Like many smaller cities in areas surrounding large metropolitan areas in California, the City of Stockton has experienced a large increase in population in recent years. Between 1990 and 2005, Stockton's population had grown by 32.5 percent from 210,943 residents to 279,513 residents. Without considering population changes over time, increases or decreases in the number of violent crimes could simply reflect increases or decreases in the population rather than a change in violent dynamics in the city. As such, crime rates, measured as the number of crimes per 100,000 residents, are used to examine trends in cities with fluctuating populations.

Figure 1 presents the violent crime rate in Stockton between 1985 and 2005. The violent crime rate increased by 82.6 percent from 883.8 in 1985 to 1,613.5 in 1994. Over the next four years, the violent crime rate decreased by 30 percent to 1,129.2 in 1998.

Violent crime then increased again to a rate of 1,461.3 in 2002, decreased slightly over the next two years, and then increased to 1,503.3 in 2005. As Figure 2 reveals, Stockton violent crime trends are driven by changes in the aggravated assault rate with some influence exerted by recent increases in the robbery rate. The overall violent crime rate follows the same trajectory as the aggravated assault rate with nearly identical peaks and valleys in 1985 (417.8), 1994 (898.3), 1997 (629.6), 2002 (927.9), and 2005 (964.2). Robbery rates are less volatile and don't always move in step with aggravated assault rates. Robbery rates increased by 75.5 percent from 399.1 in 1985 to 700.4 in 1993. Over the next six years, robbery rates decreased by 47 percent to 371 in 1999. Robbery rates slowly increased over the next six years to 485.5 in 2005.

Figure 3 presents yearly changes in forcible rape and homicide rates in Stockton between 1985 and 2005. Rape rates increased by 75.5 percent between 1985 and 1989 from 51.5 to 90.4 (note the sudden jump between 1988 and 1989) and then declined to a low point of 39 in 2005. Homicide rates increased by 65.8 percent from 15.3 in 1985 to 25.5 in 1991. Homicide slowly decreased over the next six years until there was a sudden large drop from 19.7 in 1997 to 11.3 in 1998. Since this noteworthy drop, there has been a steady increase to a homicide rate of 14.7 in 2005. While this rise is meaningful, homicide rates between 1999 and 2005 are lower than homicide rates in the 1980s through 1997.

As Figure 4 suggests, most of the volatility in homicide trends were driven by the number of gun homicides per year. After the homicide drop between 1997 and 1998, gun homicides have moved almost in step with total homicide (with the exception of 2003 and 2004). Interestingly, most of the recent increase in aggravated assaults is not driven

by increased numbers of gun assaults in Stockton. Figure 5 reveals that gun assault incidents decreased between 2001 and 2004 and remained relatively low in 2005. Therefore, the increased aggravated assault rate seems to be driven by aggravated assaults using other means such as knives, blunt instruments, and hands and feet.

The Nature of Stockton Homicide, 2004 – 2005

Homicide is of interest not only because of its severity but also because it is a fairly reliable barometer of all violent crime. In the United States, no other crime is measured as accurately and precisely. State and local law enforcement agencies are required to report these data to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR) data system. Local databases maintained by police departments provide analysts with useful information on the sex, age, and race of homicide victims and homicide offenders as well as policy-relevant information on the locations of incidents and the types of weapons used.

Police departments are usually well positioned to monitor yearly changes in the characteristics of homicide victims and homicide offenders and use crime-mapping technology to identify violent hot spot locations. However, while these data are useful for tracking urban homicide trends and patterns, official data systems often provide very limited information on the circumstances of the incident and the relationships between victims and offenders.⁵ In particular, research has revealed that many unknown homicides and 'acquaintance' homicides are actually killings among rival gang members, drug dealers, or organized crime figures.⁶

⁵ Loftin (1986); Maxfield (1989); Reidel (1989).

⁶ Braga, A., Piehl, A., and Kennedy, D. (1999) Youth Homicide in Boston: An Assessment of Supplementary Homicide Reports. *Homicide Studies*. Vol. 3, pp 277- 299; Kates, D., Schaffer, H.,

The homicide analysis research was conducted in May 2006 and focused on 84 homicide victims and 80 known homicide offenders associated with incidents that occurred in 2004 and 2005.⁷ Almost 60 percent of the homicide victims were killed with firearms and 57 percent of the homicides had been cleared by arrest, the issuance of a warrant, or through exceptional circumstances (e.g. homicide was ruled as justifiable self-defense; see Table 1). As Table 2 reveals, homicide victims and homicide offenders share similar characteristics. Most victims and offenders were minority males. However, offenders were younger than their victims. The mean offender age was 26.5 and nearly 59 percent of offenders were ages 24 or younger. The mean victim age was 32.3 and only 38 percent of victims were ages 24 or younger. Offenders were also more likely to be identified as gang members by Stockton police officers and SPD gang intelligence data. Slightly more than 52 percent of homicide offenders were known gang members. Nearly 37 percent of homicide victims were known gang members.

Urban homicide is largely committed by and against highly active criminal offenders with extensive involvement in the criminal justice system. A large body of research evidence documents the extensive prior criminal justice system involvement of an overwhelming majority of homicide offenders.⁸ In general, only 15 percent of U.S.

Lattimer, J., Murray, G., and Cassem, E. (1995) Guns and Public Health: Epidemic of Violence or Pandemic of Propaganda? *Tennessee Law Review*. Vol. 62, pp 513-596.

⁷ This exercise included three homicide incidents where the victim was attempting to rob a convenience store and was killed during the encounter by the store clerk. In these cases, the use of force by the clerk was ruled justifiable self-defense. As such, these three victims were not included in official SPD crime statistics. These incidents were included in this analysis to better understand the underlying dynamics associated with violent crime in Stockton.

⁸ See, e.g. Wolfgang, M. (1958) *Patterns in Criminal Homicide*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press; Swersey, A. and Enloe, E. (1975) *Homicide in Harlem*. New York: Rand; Kleck, G. and Bordua, D. 1983. The Factual Foundation for Certain Key Assumptions of Gun Control. *Law & Policy Quarterly*. Vol. 5, pp 271-298.

residents have a criminal record of any kind.⁹ By comparison, a 1988 Bureau of Justice Statistics study of 3,119 homicide defendants under indictment in the 75 largest U.S. counties revealed that nearly 77 percent had a prior criminal record.¹⁰

The names and dates of birth of the 2005 Stockton homicide victims and homicide offenders were ran through the California Law Enforcement Tracking System (CLETS) to obtain their adult criminal records within the State of California (Table 3). Nearly 62 percent of the homicide offenders and 70 percent of the homicide victims had at least one prior arrest on their record. These previously “known” individuals had extensive involvement with the criminal justice system. Of the 21 known offenders, one-third were under active probation supervision at the time they committed their homicide. Nearly 62 percent had been on probation, 38 percent had been incarcerated in a correctional facility, and one-third were convicted felons before they committed their homicide. Of the 30 known offenders, slightly more than 43 percent were under active probation supervision at the time they were killed. Seventy percent had been on probation, nearly 57 percent had been incarcerated in a correctional facility, and more than 53 percent were convicted felons before they were killed. Gang-involved homicide victims and offenders were more likely to have at least one arrest prior to the homicide incident, and had high levels of prior criminal justice system involvement.

Homicide victims had lengthier prior arrest records when compared to homicide offenders (Table 3). As described earlier, victims were older than offenders; the age differential allows for the accumulation of additional arrests on their criminal records. Homicide victims had, on average, 10.6 arrests before they were killed, and homicide

⁹ Cooney, M. (1997) The Decline of Elite Homicide. *Criminology*. Vol. 35, pp 381 – 407.

¹⁰ Dawson, J. and Boland, B. (1993) *Murder in Large Urban Counties, 1988*. Special Report. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice.

offenders had, on average, 7.3 prior arrests before they killed their victim. The criminal histories of Stockton homicide victims and offenders were characterized by a wide variety of prior armed violent crimes, unarmed violent crimes, property crimes, drug crimes, nonviolent firearm crimes (such as illegal gun possession), and disorder offenses. In the gang literature, this wide range of offending is described as ‘cafeteria-style’ offending.¹¹

Like most police departments, official Stockton Police data were limited in the capturing the circumstances of homicide incidents. Among other data collection problems, homicide incident data are usually recorded during the early stages of homicide investigations and, at that point in time, circumstances of the incidents are often unknown.¹² Homicide detectives acquire detailed knowledge of the incident as the investigation unfolds. Moreover, criminal justice and human service practitioners with working street knowledge on offenders, criminally active groups, and crime hot spots often have important information on homicides.¹³ Reviewing homicide incidents with knowledgeable practitioners can be a very productive way to gain policy-relevant insights on the nature of homicide in a particular jurisdiction.

The Stockton homicide incident review process involved homicide detectives sharing their knowledge of the circumstances associated with particular incidents. The author served as the facilitator of the meetings. A chronological list of all homicide victims and suspects between January 1, 2004 and December 31, 2005 was provided to

¹¹ Klein, M. (1995) *The American Street Gang: Its Nature, Prevalence, and Control*. New York: Oxford University Press.

¹² Reidel (1989).

¹³ Kennedy, D., Braga, A., and Piehl, A. (1997) The (Un)known Universe: Mapping Gangs and Gang Violence in Boston. In Weisburd, D. and McEwen (eds.), *Crime Mapping and Crime Prevention*. Crime Prevention Studies, Vol. 8. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.

each participant. For each incident on the list, the detective investigating the homicide shared his/her knowledge on the circumstances of incidents. The author then posed some basic questions to the officers on the circumstances of the incident, the location of the incident, and whether the victim and offender knew each other. The author took careful notes on the officers' knowledge of homicide events; these notes were entered into a database and analyzed.

Law enforcement in different jurisdictions use different definitions of 'gang-related' crime, which affect the amount of gang-related crimes reported. For example, Los Angeles Police define homicide as 'gang-related' when gang members participate, regardless of motive; Chicago police use a more restrictive definition and classify homicide as 'gang-related' only if there is a gang motive evident.¹⁴ In this analysis, a definition of gang-related homicide developed in Boston was used.¹⁵ Homicides were considered connected to gangs if (1) the offender was a gang member and (2) the motivation behind the homicide was known or believed to be connected to gang activity, or if (1) the victim was a gang member and (2) the motivation behind the homicide was known or believed to be connected to gang activity. Thus, the killing of a gang member by another gang member would be considered gang-related; the killing of a non-gang member bystander during the same dispute would be considered gang-related; the killing of a gang member by a non-gang member during a robbery attempt would not be considered gang-related.

¹⁴ Maxson, C., and Klein, M. (1990) Street Gang Violence: Twice as Great or Half as Great? In Huff, C.R. (ed.), *Gangs in America*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.

¹⁵ Kennedy, D., Piehl, A., and Braga, A. (1996) Youth Violence in Boston: Gun Markets, Serious Youth Offenders, and a Use-Reduction Strategy. *Law and Contemporary Problems*. Vol. 59, pp 147- 196.

The Stockton Police officers were able to provide information on the circumstances of the incident in 92 percent (77 of 84) of the homicides. The results of the homicide review exercise for incidents with known circumstances are presented in Table 4. Personal disputes accounted for almost one-quarter of Stockton homicides. Ongoing conflicts between rival gangs generated 22 percent of the homicides and gang-involved drug business disputes accounted for an additional 6.5 percent of homicides. Therefore, gang-related motives were evident in nearly 29 percent of all Stockton homicides and 42 percent of the 50 gun homicides that occurred during the study time period. Domestic disputes and family violence caused almost 17 percent of the homicides. Non-gang drug-related disputes generated for almost 8 percent of homicides and robberies of drug dealer or drug buyer accounted for another 5 percent of homicides. Taken together, drug and non-drug related robberies generated nearly 21 percent of Stockton homicides.

Arrested Non-fatal Serious Violent Offenders, 2004 - 2005

To gain further insight on the nature of street violence in Stockton, individuals arrested for non-fatal serious violent crimes in 2004 and 2005 were examined. Prior SPD analyses of aggravated assaults suggest that 31 percent of these incidents involved domestic violence.¹⁶ To maintain a clearer focus on violent street offenders, this analysis was limited to aggravated assaults involving firearms, robbery, and forcible rape. The vast majority of arrested gun assault, robbery, and rape offenders were minority males (Table 5). Robbery offenders were more likely to be African-American and less likely to

¹⁶ Stockton Police Department Crime Information Center. (2005) *A Week of Violent Crime in Stockton: A Profile of the Last Seven Days in June 2005*.

be Asian compared to their gun assault counterparts. SPD officers reported that robbery offenders were a mix of specialists who were committed to a robbery career and opportunists who took advantage of easy chances to make quick money. Individuals ages 24 and younger accounted for slightly more than 71 percent of gun assault offenders and nearly 68 percent of robbery offenders. In contrast, more than 56 percent of rape offenders were 25 or older.

Gangs were involved in a noteworthy portion of gun assault arrests and a non-trivial number of robbery arrests (Table 5). According to SPD records, more than a third of arrested gun assault offenders and nearly 13 percent of arrested robbery offenders were confirmed gang members. A prior U.S. Department of Justice Project Safe Neighborhoods initiative analysis of gun assault offenders arrested between 2002 and 2003 found that a majority of these individuals were well known to the SPD before the shooting event.¹⁷ Nearly 71 percent of gun assault offenders had been arrested by the SPD at least once before they committed their assaults. On average, previously “known” gun offenders had three prior SPD arrests, three prior SPD citations, and two prior SPD field contacts.

Identifying Gangs, Criminally Active Groups, and Inter-Group Conflict Patterns

The results of the Stockton violent crime analysis, thus far, reveal that gangs are central to Stockton’s street violence problem. Gang-related motives account for a large share of homicide, and gang members are offenders in more than half of the homicides and victims in more than a third of the homicides. Gang members also represent more

¹⁷ Braga, A. (2004) *Serious Gun Violence in Stockton, California*. Cambridge, MA: Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

than a third of arrest gun assault offenders and nearly 13 percent of arrested robbery offenders. Like other departments, the Stockton Police collect detailed information on gang members in Stockton. The Stockton Police also examine the spatial distribution of violent crimes in known gang areas. Although this information was a useful starting point for a more careful inquiry, additional qualitative data collection was necessary to acquire strategic information on the group dynamics of the gangs involved in homicide.

Defining the term ‘gang’ has long been a contentious issue within academic and practitioner circles.¹⁸ The SPD uses a definition of gang developed by the California State Legislature. Section 186.22 of the California Penal Code defines a ‘criminal street gang’ as: ‘Any ongoing organization, association, or group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary activities the commission of... criminal acts... having a common name or common identifying sign or symbol, and whose members individually or collectively engage in, or have engaged in, a pattern of criminal gang activity.’¹⁹ This formal definition of a criminal street gang was used in the following data collection and analysis.

A three-hour focus group meeting was held with key Stockton Police Gang Street Enforcement Team (GSET) and Gang Violence Suppression Unit (GVSU) officers to collect additional data on the characteristics of Stockton gangs. A GVSU sergeant was present for the entire focus group session, and particular officers and detectives with

¹⁸ See e.g. Miller, W. (1975) *Violence by Youth Gangs and Youth Groups as a Crime Problem in Major American Cities*. Washington, DC: U.S. National Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention; Yablonsky, L. (1997) *Gangsters*. New York, NY: New York University Press; Yablonsky, L. (1962). *The Violent Gang*. London: Macmillan; Ball, R. and Curry, G.D. (1995) The Logic of Definition in Criminology: Purposes and Methods for Defining “Gangs.” *Criminology*. Vol. 33, pp 225 – 245.

¹⁹ <http://www.stocktongov.com/police/pages/tipsaboutgangs.cfm>

detailed knowledge of particular gangs were present as necessary. The SPD's gang database was used to develop an initial list of gangs and gang memberships. Each gang on the list was the subject of a series of relatively brief questions. The officers and detectives were asked to share their knowledge on the criminal activities of the gang, the estimated membership of the gang, any ongoing conflicts the gang had with other gangs, any notable alliances the gang had with other gangs, and any other relevant information. These observations were recorded as notes and later entered into a computerized database for analysis.

The exercise found that there were 40 active street gangs in Stockton with an estimated membership of between 2,507 and 2,813 individuals.²⁰ Most active Stockton gangs were comprised of relatively small numbers of members. Nearly 38 percent of the gangs had 25 or fewer gang members and nearly 68 percent of the gangs had 50 or fewer members (see Table 6). While gang members ranged between the ages of 11 and 49 years of age, the median age of a Stockton gang member was 19, and 69.5 percent were between 15 and 24 years old.²¹ According to the California Department of Finance, gang members represented less than one percent of Stockton's 286,041 total residents.²² While gangs represent a small percentage of Stockton's residents, they generate a large share of its violent crime problem.

²⁰ This estimate does not include gang-involved individuals who recently arrived from the Bay Area. As will be discussed below, the SPD has begun to collect intelligence on criminals from East Palo Alto, Oakland, and San Francisco. As such, counts of these newly arrived gang members are preliminary and not included in the estimate.

²¹ These figures on the ages of individual gang members were calculated by an analysis of 2,661 individuals who appeared in the SPD gang intelligence database in January 2006.

²² <http://www.dof.ca.gov/HTML/DEMOGRAP/E-1table.xls>

The qualitative data were used to construct a sociogram of gang conflicts and alliances (Figure 6). Stockton gangs have ongoing feuds that fall largely within particular racial groups: Asian gang conflicts, Hispanic gang conflicts, and African-American gang conflicts. Within each broad set of ethnic antagonisms, particular gangs form alliances with other gangs. For example, the Asian Boys, Loc Town Crips, and associates are united in their fight against the Crazy Brother Clan, Tiny Rascal Gang, Moon Light Strangers, and associates. Conflicts among Hispanic gangs mainly involve a very violent rivalry between Norteno gangs (associated with criminal groups and gangs in Northern California) and Sureno gangs (associated with criminal groups and gangs in Southern California). However, while Norteno and Sureno gangs are united in their fight against their common rivals, they also have ongoing conflicts within their loose alliances. For instance, the SPD officers reported that the Norteno gangs South Side Stocktone and East Side Stocktone have a relatively long standing feud but will help each other in their conflicts with the Sureno gangs.

African-American gangs, such as the Westside Bloods and East Coast Crips, divide along Blood (red gang colors) and Crip (blue gang colors) lines. Stockton Police gang officers report an uneasy alliance among these groups involving street-level drug sales. As long as everyone is earning money, these gangsters do not fight over turf or colors. However, violent disputes occasionally develop among these groups when drug business conflicts and personal issues arise. Stockton African-American gangs do have newly-developed violent rivalries with recent arrivals from the San Francisco Bay Area. Local gangsters identify themselves with the tag “209” (Stockton’s Area Code) and their new rivals from East Palo Alto, East Side Oakland, and San Francisco claim “415” and

“510” (Area Codes from these cities).²³ The SPD has been collecting intelligence on individuals from the Bay Area involved with criminal activity in Stockton. However, SPD gang officers report that their intelligence collecting efforts on the new violent groups and individuals should be enhanced as rapid immigration to Stockton from Bay Area cities challenge their limited ability to maintain intelligence on local criminal groups while investigating these rapidly-expanding new criminal networks.

While it is difficult to estimate the contribution of recently-arrived Bay Area criminals to violent crime problems from existing SPD data,²⁴ the qualitative analysis of 2004 and 2005 homicides revealed that two homicide victims who were killed in gang-related drug disputes were originally from the Bay Area. In addition, former and current Bay Area residents were identified by SPD detectives as the offenders in three homicides of Stockton residents: one victim killed in a gang-related dispute, one victim killed in a drug-related dispute, and one victim executed during a robbery.

SPD intelligence reports document the arrival of the Kumi Afrikaan Nation criminal organization in Stockton (“Kumi” is Swahili for 10, the sum of the individual numbers from the 415 Area Code). Kumi Nation is an African-American prison gang founded in Folsom Prison by convicts from Oakland, East Palo Alto, San Francisco, and Richmond. According to SPD intelligence, the first known members of the Kumi Nation

²³ Conflicts among African-American gangs have undergone significant changes over the past six years. In 2000, African-American Blood and Crip gangs were engaged in a bloody dispute. By 2003, Blood and Crip gangs had forged alliances around illegal enterprises such as street level drug sales and robbery. Currently, this peace has largely remained intact and new rivalries have developed against recent Bay Area arrivals. Braga, A., Kennedy, D., and Tita, G. (2002) *New Approaches to the Strategic Prevention of Gang and Group-Involved Violence*. In Huff, C.R. (ed.) *Gangs in America*. Third Edition. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications; Braga, A. (2005) *Analyzing Homicide Problems: Practical Approaches to Developing a Policy-Relevant Description of Serious Urban Violence*. *Security Journal*. Vol. 18, pp 17- 32.

²⁴ For example, SPD arrest data document current residences of apprehended offenders and do not capture the origins of the arrestee. Therefore, it is not possible to determine whether a changing percentage of arrested offenders are new arrivals from Bay Area cities.

came to Stockton in 2001 and the gang has become increasingly involved in street-level crack cocaine sales, home invasions of the residences of known drug dealers, street robberies, and commercial robberies. The SPD estimates there are between 60 and 70 Kumi gangsters in Stockton and 95 percent of these individuals are new arrivals to the city. Kumi gang members primarily affiliate with Bloods and occasionally engage in crimes with Crips. As long as other street-level gangsters do not interfere with their criminal enterprises, Kumi gangsters focus on illegal money-making ventures rather than engaging in expressive violence.

Basic Dimensions of Robbery and Aggravated Assault Incidents in Stockton, 2004-2005

More than half of Stockton robberies were not committed with a weapon (“strong arm”) and nearly 31 percent involved a firearm (Table 7). Similarly, many aggravated assaults involved “hands and feet” (39.1 percent). Firearms were used in almost 15 percent of aggravated assaults. Street robberies account for the largest portion of robbery incidents (40.9 percent) between 2004 and 2005 (Table 8). According to SPD officers, robberies of migrant workers, who keep cash on them rather than in a bank, represent a noteworthy portion of street robberies. Robberies of convenience stores, commercial businesses, service stations, and banks represent 27.5 percent of Stockton robberies during this time period. Apartments and residences were the locations of nearly 12 percent of robberies.

A number of research studies suggest that crime is not spread evenly across city landscapes. Rather, there is significant clustering of crime in small places, or “hot spots,”

that generate half of all criminal events.²⁵ Even within the most crime-ridden neighborhoods, crime clusters at a few discrete locations and other areas are relatively crime free.²⁶ Further, conclusive research evidence links this variation to physical and social characteristics of particular blocks and multiple dwellings within a neighborhood.²⁷ Like other cities, Stockton has high activity violent crime hot spots. Figure 7 presents maps of violent crime hot spot areas for the first and second halves of 2005.

To further examine the clustering of violent crime in Stockton, an analysis of 2004 and 2005 violent crime incidents in high-activity Reporting District (RD) areas was conducted (237 SPD-defined RD areas). The RDs were ranked by the total number of violent crimes and by varying subcategories of violent crimes (such as the total number of homicides, total number of convenience store robberies, and so on). The portion of violent crime accounted for by the top 10 RDs in each category was noted. Due to ties in violent crime counts, the “top ten” sometimes included additional or fewer RDs.²⁸ Table 9 presents the results of the analysis, and Table 10 identifies the top RD in each violent crime category.

When the broad category “violent crime” was disaggregated into specific categories, the concentration of violent offending was, for certain crime types, very high. About 5 percent of the RDs accounted for 17 percent of total violent crime, 20 percent of

²⁵ Pierce, G., Spaar, S., and Briggs, L. (1988) *The Character of Police Work: Strategic and Tactical Implications*. Boston, MA: Center for Applied Social Research, Northeastern University; Sherman, L., Gartin, P., and Buerger, M. (1989) Hot Spots of Predatory Crime: Routine Activities and the Criminology of Place. *Criminology*, Vol. 27, pp. 27-56.

²⁶ Sherman et al. (1989).

²⁷ Taylor, R., and Gottfredson, S. (1986) Environment Design, Crime, and Prevention: An Examination of Community Dynamics. In A.J. Reiss and M. Tonry (Eds.), *Communities and Crime*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

²⁸ For instance, bank robberies are relatively rare events and were highly clustered at a few locations. After the top 8 RD areas, there were only one or zero incidents for the remaining RD areas. In contrast, there were 6 RDs with 5 robberies of apartments and residences; these ties increased the top 10 to 14.

total aggravated assault, and 22 percent of total robbery. Within the robbery category, specific RDs generated large shares of particular types of robberies: 3.4 percent generated 60.6 percent of bank robberies, 3.8 percent generated 53.7 percent of service station robberies, 4.2 percent generated 36 percent of commercial business robberies, 5.9 percent generated 34.9 percent of apartment and residential robberies, 4.2 percent generated 31.1 percent of street robberies, and 4.6 percent generated 29.2 percent of convenience store robberies. Within these “hot” RDs, robberies were further concentrated in a few areas and often at a handful of addresses. Some examples:

- Street robbery: RD 102 had 10 incidents at intersection of Channel Street and North Sutton Street. RD 106 had 11 incidents at intersection of East Hazelton and San Joaquin Street.
- Bank robbery: There were 3 bank robberies at 2427 West Hammer Lane.
- Commercial business robbery: Of the 15 total incidents in this area, RD 334 had 7 incidents at 4950 Pacific Avenue, 5 incidents at 4915 Claremont Avenue, and 3 incidents at 5110 Pacific Avenue. Of the 19 total incidents in RD 180, 9 incidents were at 678 North Wilson Way. Of the 18 incidents in RD 264, 11 incidents were at 1155 West March Lane.
- Convenience store robbery: Of the 10 incidents in RD 324, 5 were at 7906 North El Dorado Street, 3 were at 7932 North El Dorado Street, and 2 were at 7924 North El Dorado Street. Of the 9 incidents in RD 180, 5 were at 1050 North Wilson Way and 4 were at 678 North Wilson Way.
- Service station robbery: Of the 6 incidents in RD 221, 3 were at 508 West Charter Way, 2 were at 620 West Charter Way, and 1 was at 440 West Charter Way. Of the 5 incidents in RD 129, 2 were at 701 East Charter Way, 2 were at 749 East Charter Way, and 1 was at the intersection on East Charter Way and Grant Street.

Aggravated assault incidents and homicide were similarly clustered in a small number of hot spot areas. About 5 percent of the RDs generated 30.4 percent of firearm aggravated assaults, 26.7 percent of the knife / cutting instrument aggravated assaults, and 18.8 percent of the hands and feet aggravated assaults. Relative to hands and feet

aggravated assaults, gun assaults are less likely to involve domestic violence and more likely to involve “street” motives such as gang and drug-related violence. Differing motives may explain some of the difference in clustering between these two types of assaultive violence.

Violent crime in Stockton also tends to occur at night and on weekend days. Between the hours of 8 pm and 2 am (25 percent of hours in the day), a majority of violent events take place, including: 39.0 percent of all violent crimes, 37.7 percent of robberies, 39.4 percent of aggravated assaults, 43.3 percent of homicides, 45.1 percent of rapes, and 50.2 percent of aggravated gun assaults. On weekend days (Friday, Saturday, Sunday – 42.8 percent of days in the week), 47.1 percent of all violent crimes, 54.1 percent of homicides, 46.8 percent of robberies, 47.3 percent of rapes, and 53.6 percent of aggravated gun assaults occur. Temporal analyses of crime patterns can be particularly useful for understanding specific types of violent crimes. For example, in 2004 and 2005, Stockton experienced 33 bank robberies. More than half of these robberies were committed on two days – Monday and Friday (51.5 percent, 17 of 33), and slightly more than three-quarters occurred between 9:00 am and 6:00 pm (75.8 percent, 25 of 33).

Preventing Violent Crime in Stockton: Challenges and Opportunities

The City of Stockton is in the midst of an important revitalization and economic expansion process. The city has been recognized for these impressive gains through its designation by the National Civic League as an “All America City” in 1999 and 2004. While Stockton seems to be a city on the rise, many urban problems persist that create challenges for effective violence prevention. Poverty, rapid population change, drug

abuse, overcrowded correctional facilities, and limited financial resources test the ability of the police to respond to violent crime. A 2006 report by the Public Policy Institute of California identified San Joaquin County as having one of the highest poverty rates in California.²⁹ In 2004, the U.S. Census reported that 23 percent of residents and 19.8 percent of families in Stockton lived below the federal poverty level.³⁰ Between 2000 and 2004, Stockton grew by an estimated 29,769 residents; 4,653 of these new arrivals to the city were living below the poverty line. Poverty and rapid population changes are well-known community-level risk factors for violence.³¹

Drug abuse is an ongoing concern in Stockton. According to the Office of National Drug Control Policy, the primary drug threat in California's Central Valley is methamphetamine.³² Like other Central Valley cities, Stockton is struggling with high levels of methamphetamine use and its associated public health and crime problems.³³ Informal local estimates suggest that up to 75 percent of property crimes are committed by substance abusers and 95 percent of area parolees have substance abuse problems.³⁴ The availability of drug treatment for offenders has decreased over time (in 2005, the local methadone program was reduced from serving approximately 650 patients to 200 patients)³⁵ and the number of city-employed gang outreach workers has dwindled (from 6

²⁹ http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/cacounts/CC_506DRCC.pdf

³⁰ <http://www.census.gov>

³¹ Sampson, R. (2002) *The Community*. In Wilson, J.Q. and Petersilia, J (Eds.), *Crime*. Oakland, CA: ICS Press.

³² In 2002, there were 13,125 admissions for methamphetamine abuse to treatment programs in the nine Central Valley counties. By comparison, there were 8,553 admissions for heroin abuse, 4,673 admissions for marijuana abuse, and 3,072 for cocaine abuse.

http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/hidta04/central_valley.html

³³ Smith, S. (2006) Officials Vow to Continue Meth Fight. *The Record*, May 9.

³⁴ Fitzgerald, M (2005) Escape Hatch in the County Jail Must Be Closed. *The Record*, November 23.

³⁵ <http://www.stocktongov.com/CityCouncil/BlueRibbonCrime/minutes/2005-09-28blueRibbonMinutes.cfm>

to 1).³⁶ While overcrowding has been a problem at the San Joaquin County Jail for more than 17 years, overcrowding hit record levels with 1,480 inmates in December 2005.³⁷ In 2004, the jail booked 30,557 inmates but released 3,622 before they served their sentence.³⁸ The capacity of the local criminal justice system is similarly strained by large caseloads for judges and probation officers.³⁹

Clearly, this is a challenging environment for the SPD to launch an effective response to increasing violent crime. The existing research literature suggests that crime can be affected by the number of police⁴⁰ and what the police do.⁴¹ Police departments need to be adequately staffed and need to engage innovative crime prevention strategies that are focused on identifiable risks such as high-rate offenders, repeat victims, and crime hot spots. It is obviously difficult for police departments to implement violence prevention strategies if there aren't enough officers to handle basic police work such as answering 911 emergency calls for service. Similarly, optimum levels of police staffing will not be enough to reduce violence if the police are not appropriately focused on preventing violent crime problems.

³⁶ Interview with outreach worker Jose Gomez; see also Ioffe, K. (2006) Struggle for the Streets. *The Record*, April 23.

³⁷ Martinez, M (2006) San Joaquin County Jail Hits Record Numbers. *Oakland Tribune*, January 23.

³⁸ Fitzgerald, M (2005) It is Time to Quit Crying and Build a Jail. *The Record*, July 27.

³⁹ <http://www.stocktongov.com/CityCouncil/BlueRibbonCrime/minutes/2005-09-28blueRibbonMinutes.cfm>

⁴⁰ Marvell, T., and Moody, C. (1996) Specification Problems, Police Levels, and Crime Rates. *Criminology*, Vol. 34, pp. 609 – 646.; Levitt, S. (1997) Using Election Cycles in Policing Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime. *Public Policy*, Vol. 23, pp. 523 – 545.

⁴¹ Braga, A. (2002) *Problem-Oriented Policing and Crime Prevention*. New York: Criminal Justice Press; Skogan, W., and Frydl, K. (2004) *Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing: The Evidence*. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press; Weisburd, D., and Eck, J. (2004). What Can Police Do to Prevent Crime, Disorder, and Fear? *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 593, pp. 42 – 65.

The Need for Additional Officers

As a result of the population increase and persistent urban problems, the SPD has experienced a corresponding increase in its workload. Between 2004 and 2005, reported Part I crimes increased by 4.3 percent, citizen calls for service increased by 15 percent, arrests increased by 17.5 percent, and newly-initiated criminal investigations increased by 28 percent.⁴² Despite the increased work, the SPD maintains better than average clearance rates. In 2004, the most recent year State data are available, the SPD cleared homicides, robberies, burglaries, and auto theft at higher rates than overall clearance rates for other California law enforcement agencies (Table 11). The SPD cleared aggravated assaults at a slightly lower rate than other California law enforcement agencies.

While the City of Stockton has increased the authorized number of sworn officers in recent years, the SPD remains understaffed when compared to other police departments serving similar populations. Between 2004 and 2005, the authorized number of sworn officers increased by 2.3 percent from 399 to 408 officers (actual numbers increased from 374 to 395 officers).⁴³ With a 2005 population of 279,513, the ratio of authorized full-time sworn officers per 1,000 was 1.46. According to the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics' 2003 Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics report, the average ratio of full-time sworn officers per 1,000 residents was 2.5 for local police departments serving cities with populations 250,000 or greater, and 1.9 for local police departments serving cities with populations between 100,000 and 249,999.⁴⁴

While police resource allocation is influenced by a range of factors such as population growth, crime trends, workload demands, local conditions, and peer city comparisons,

⁴² Stockton Police Department (2006) *2006 – 2007 Budget*.

⁴³ Stockton Police Department (2006) *2006 – 2007 Budget*.

⁴⁴ <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/lpd03.pdf>

prior empirical research studies suggest that officer-to-population ratios should be about 2.0 per 1,000 residents.⁴⁵

Several other local California police departments are notoriously understaffed when compared to police departments elsewhere in the United States. When compared to other selected California cities, the SPD sworn officer ratio is lower than Oakland (1.91), Long Beach (1.9), Sacramento (1.75), and Fresno (1.67); comparable to Bakersfield (1.42), Modesto (1.4), and Riverside (1.38); and higher than Santa Ana (1.08) and Anaheim (1.06).⁴⁶ Like many cities, municipal budgets in Stockton are strained and public officials need to make difficult funding decisions to support an increase. To bring the ratio to 1.9 in 2005, the SPD would need to be authorized for some 530 full-time sworn officers. At an estimated cost of \$150,000 per officer (benefits, base salary, and other expenses), The City of Stockton would need to spend more than \$18 million per year for the 122 additional officers.⁴⁷

While an increase of this magnitude is probably not feasible, some increase in staffing seems necessary. Los Angeles Police Department Commissioner William Bratton has publicly lamented the low staffing levels of the Los Angeles Police Department and has worked with Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa to develop proposals for new revenue streams to hire additional officers.⁴⁸ With the support of Mayor Michael Bloomberg, the New York Police Department is currently adding 800 additional officers

⁴⁵ Walker, S. and Katz, C. (2002) *The Police in America*. New York: McGraw-Hill; Kelling, G. et al. (1974) *The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment: A Technical Report*. Washington, DC: Police Foundation; RAND Corporation (1995) *Force Requirements in Stability Operations* (published in *Parameters*, Winter 1995, pp. 59 – 69, author James Quinlivan).

⁴⁶ These are 2003 estimates gleaned from a 2005 policy report by the City of Fresno available at: http://www.ci.fresno.ca.us/public_docs/FPD_Needs_Assessment.pdf

⁴⁷ Stockton Police Department (2006) *2006 – 2007 Budget*.

⁴⁸ A current proposal suggests a gradual increase in garbage removal fees to fund new police hires. Hyman, S. (2006) 155% Hike in Garbage Fee Urged. *Los Angeles Times*, April 13, p. 1.

to its force of some 40,000 police officers.⁴⁹ This expansion was not due to an increasing crime rate (overall crime was down 6 percent in 2006 relative to the same time period in 2005). Rather, the new hiring was to address current and projected increases in New York City's population that would negatively affect the NYPD's workload and ability to fight crime. The newly-hired officers will be added to regular patrol as well as new crime prevention initiatives and ongoing antiterrorism efforts. The citizens of Stockton have shown a willingness to pay for additional police officers by passing Measure W which raised taxes by one-quarter cent to hire 40 additional officers.⁵⁰ As part of the Mayor's Crime Suppression Initiative, the Stockton City Council appropriated \$435,158 in overtime funds to enhance SPD violent crime suppression activities in August 2005.

Recommendation 1: The City of Stockton needs to increase the number of authorized Stockton Police officers to bring the average ratio of full-time sworn officers closer to the ratio of police departments serving jurisdictions with similar population sizes. In hiring these officers, it will be necessary to increase the number of support staff and supervisory positions. A hiring plan must be developed to bring the number of SPD officers and civilian staff in line with the staffing levels of other departments.

Controlling Violent Crime Hot Spots

As documented earlier, violent crime clusters in very small "hot spot" areas of Stockton. Hot spots policing has become a very popular way for police departments to prevent crime. A recent Police Foundation report found that 7 in 10 departments with more than 100 sworn officers reported using crime mapping to identify crime hot spots.⁵¹

⁴⁹ Rutenberg, J. and Chan, S. (2006) City to Add 800 to Police Force by Summer '07. *The New York Times*, March 22, p. 1.

⁵⁰ Reeder, D. (2005) In Search of Money From Measure W. *The Record*, December 17.

⁵¹ Weisburd, D., Mastrofski, S., McNally, A.M., Greenspan, R., and Willis, J. (2003) Reforming to Preserve: Compstat and Strategic Problem Solving in American Policing. *Criminology and Public Policy*, Vol. 2, pp. 421 – 456.

The appeal of focusing limited resources on a small number of high-activity crime places is straightforward. If police can prevent crime at these hot spots, then police might be able to reduce total crime. A growing body of research evidence suggests that focused police interventions, such as directed patrols, proactive arrests, and community problem-oriented policing, can produce significant crime prevention gains at high-crime “hot spots” without substantially displacing crime to nearby locations.⁵² The United States National Academy of Sciences’ Committee to Review Police Policy and Practices concluded that “a strong body of evidence suggests that taking a focused geographic approach to crime problems can increase the effectiveness of policing.”⁵³

The Kansas City Gun Project, and its subsequent replications in Indianapolis and Pittsburgh, used place-oriented policing strategies to good effect in preventing gun crime in gun violence hot spots. The Kansas City Gun Project examined the gun violence prevention effects of proactive patrol and intensive enforcement of firearms laws via safety frisks during traffic stops, plain-view searches and seizures, and searches incident to arrests on other charges.⁵⁴ The Gun Project intervention was limited to one target patrol beat that was matched to a comparison beat with nearly identical numbers of drive-by shootings in 1991. Simple computer analyses of call and incident data were used to focus police interventions at hot spot locations within the targeted beat. A pair of two-officer cars, working overtime from 7 p.m. to 1 a.m. seven days a week and not required to answer citizen calls for service, provided extra patrol in the targeted beat. The officers initiated a high volume of contact with the street population. A rigorous evaluation

⁵² Braga (2002); Skogan and Frydl (2004); Weisburd and Eck (2004).

⁵³ Skogan and Frydl (2004), p. 247.

⁵⁴ Sherman, L. and Rogan, D. (1995) Effects of Gun Seizures on Gun Violence: ‘Hot Spots’ Patrol in Kansas City. *Justice Quarterly*, Vol. 12, pp. 673-694.

revealed that proactive patrols focused on firearm recoveries resulted in a 65 percent increase in gun seizures and a 49 percent decrease in gun crimes in the target beat area.

In July 1997, the Indianapolis Police Department (IPD) implemented a police strategy similar to the Kansas City program.⁵⁵ While the replication evaluation noted differences between the Kansas City and Indianapolis programs in area characteristics, baseline levels of firearms crime, dosage levels of patrol activities, and evaluation data availabilities, the Indianapolis program tested the effects of two different types of directed patrol strategies on firearms crime. In the North district, the IPD pursued a directed patrol strategy that sought to prevent gun violence by focusing on suspicious activities and locations. In the East district, the IPD pursued a general deterrence strategy that attempted to prevent gun violence by maximizing the number of vehicle stops in the targeted area. The evaluation revealed that there were significant decreases in gun crime, homicide, aggravated assault with a gun, and armed robbery in the North district. No statistically significant changes in gun crime were noted in the East district.

Following the encouraging experience in Kansas City, Pittsburgh focused on suppressing illegal guns on city streets through the implementation of a special Gun Suppression Patrol program.⁵⁶ Two patrol teams of four officers each were assigned to separate police zones experiencing high rates of illegal gun activity. With the aid of crime maps and reports on recent shots fired activity, the patrol teams focused on high-risk times and high-risk places in targeted areas. The patrol teams initiated citizen contacts through traffic stops and “stop and talk” activities with persons on foot. These

⁵⁵ McGarrell, E., Chermak, S., Weiss, A., and Wilson, J. (2001) Reducing Firearms Violence Through Directed Police Patrol. *Criminology & Public Policy*, Vol. 1, pp. 119-148.

⁵⁶ Cohen, J. and Ludwig, J. (2003) Policing Crime Guns. In J. Ludwig and P. Cook (eds.), *Evaluating Gun Policy*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

contacts were used as an opportunity to solicit information and investigate suspicious activities associated with illegal carrying and use of guns. When warranted for officer safety reasons (usually suspicious actions or demeanor), “Terry” pat-downs for weapons were conducted; these searches sometimes escalated to more thorough checks when there was reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and an arrest was made. The evaluation found that shots-fired citizen calls for service were reduced by more than 50 percent in one target area and gunshot injuries were down by nearly 70 percent in another target area, representing a reduction of 2.5 gunshot injuries weekly in the latter target area.

Beyond thinking about the relative crime prevention value of these programs, we need to know more about community reaction to increased levels of police enforcement action. Indeed, some observers question the fairness and intrusiveness of aggressive law enforcement approaches and caution that street searches, especially of young men and minorities, look like police harassment.⁵⁷ However, the results of the Kansas City and Indianapolis projects suggest that residents of communities suffering from high rates of gun violence welcome intensive police efforts against guns.⁵⁸ The police managers involved in these projects secured community support before and during the interventions through a series of meetings with community members. The police departments also stressed to their officers that they needed to treat citizens with respect and explain the reasons for the stop. Effective police management (leadership, supervision, and maintaining positive relationships with the community) seems to be the crucial factor in securing community support for aggressive, but respectful policing.

⁵⁷ Moore, M. (1980) The Police and Weapons Offenses. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 455, pp. 92-109; Kleck, G. (1991) *Point Blank: Guns and Violence in America*. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.

⁵⁸ Sherman and Rogan (1995); McGarrell et al. (2001).

Policing Violent Crime Hot Spots in Stockton

As part of the Mayor's 2005 Crime Suppression Initiative, the SPD initiated a hot spots policing program to reduce violence in hot spot RDs.⁵⁹ The key elements of the hot spots policing program includes the best practices of increased presence and community problem-oriented policing. On August 21, 2005, in order to achieve increased deployment to hot spot RDs, the SPD temporarily assigned officers from patrol and specialized units to staff two 20 officer Neighborhood Impact Teams (one team each for the North and South Divisions). The increased presence and directed patrol activities were intended to deter and increase contacts with potential offenders in the area. The SPD also assigned 20 officers to the targeted hot RDs to serve as Community Police Officers (CPO) who did not answer 911 calls for service. The CPOs were charged with identifying crime and disorder problems in the targeted RDs and implementing alternative responses to the underlying situations and conditions that gave rise to repeat violence. District Commanders assisted CPOs in their problem-solving efforts by coordinating the resources of Code Enforcement, Public Works, and community-based organizations. According to SPD records, between August and December 2005, this initiative generated some 5,394 field interviews, 3,969 traffic stops, 2,342 traffic citations, 708 vehicles impounded, 595 probation searches, 487 parole searches, 457 felony arrests, 315 misdemeanor arrests, and 47 firearms confiscated.⁶⁰

The staffing of this hot spot initiative was achieved through "hire back" funds (paid overtime) that expired in December 2005. By January 8, 2006, SPD had minimized

⁵⁹ The description of the SPD Hot RD policing plan was gleaned from official memos and special orders by former Chief Mark Herder between August and December 2005.

⁶⁰ December 9, 2005 memorandum from Chief Mark Herder to City Manager Mark Lewis.

staffing levels to maintain a scaled-down version of the hot spots program. Currently, the hot spots program is staffed by 2 CPOs working each deployment phase in the Lakeview, Valley Oak, Pacific, Park, Seaport, and Sierra Vista districts, and one four officer Impact Team for each deployment phase. A preliminary SPD analysis of the fully-staffed RD hot spots policing initiative compared the four-month period after deployment to the four-month period before deployment and found that the implementation of the program was associated with a 19 percent decrease in total violent crime, 18 percent decrease in robbery, and 22 percent decrease in aggravated assault in the targeted RDs.⁶¹ In the Kentfield Action Team Area, the SPD compared the August 14 to December 31, 2005 time period to the same time period in 2004 and found 5 percent decrease in violent crime associated with the hot spots program. Finally, the SPD examined the trajectory of crime-wide crime levels over time. When the SPD implemented the hot RD program, 2005 crime levels were up 12 percent over 2004 crime levels. At the end of the program, the difference in the crimes levels between 2004 and 2005 was only 4 percent. While Stockton finished 2005 with higher crime than 2004, the hot spots policing initiative may have slowed down the increase after the implementation of the program.

While these analyses do not meet academic standards of “cause and effect,” the evidence suggests a crime prevention effect that is consistent with well-documented scientifically rigorous evaluations of hot spots policing programs.⁶² Unfortunately, due to strained resources and limited funding, the SPD was not able to maintain a fully staffed

⁶¹ These analyses were conducted by the Stockton Police Department Crime Information Center.

⁶² Most hot spot policing evaluations use experimental and quasi-experimental research designs. Control areas, statistical covariates, randomization of treatment and control areas, and extended pre-test and post-test time periods strengthen our ability to make judgments of program effectiveness. See Braga, A. (2005) Hot Spots Policing and Crime Prevention: A Systematic Review of Randomized Controlled Trials. *Journal of Experimental Criminology*, Vol. 1, pp. 317 – 342. Braga, A. (2001) The Effects of Hot Spots Policing on Crime. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 578, pp. 104 – 125.

hot RD policing program. While the short-term evidence suggests some crime prevention gains in the targeted areas, there is certainly more work that needs to be done to maintain public safety. For example, a recent position paper evaluating the conditions of the Kentfield area described the area as “a highly dysfunctional neighborhood market benefiting mainly slum landlords, drug users and dealers, or those who would otherwise profit from the poor quality of living conditions.”⁶³

Experimental hot spots policing programs are usually implemented for longer time periods than the Stockton program. A recent review of hot spots policing programs found that the deployment phase ranged between 6 and 16 months, with most programs lasting one year or longer.⁶⁴ Many police departments have adopted hot spots policing as part of their routine deployment plan and address high-activity areas with permanent hot spot teams. For example, the Chicago Police Department focuses on gun violence hot spot areas with Targeted Response Units (TRU); the South Side TRU alone has 160 officers.⁶⁵ With 4.7 police officers per 1,000 residents,⁶⁶ the Chicago Police Department is able to adequately staff their hot spots policing units.

Unless additional “hire back” resources are available to fully staff the hot RD program or more officers are hired, a deployment plan needs to be developed that maximizes the potential crime prevention benefits of the scaled-back hot RD policing initiative. Of course, the development of this plan will require careful consideration by SPD command staff, line-level officers, and community-based partners. A suggested course of action that builds on existing SPD practices might involve use of the crime

⁶³ Buki, C. (2006) *Kentfield: Final Report to the City of Stockton*, p. 1.

⁶⁴ Braga (2001), (2005).

⁶⁵ http://mesh.medill.northwestern.edu/mnschicago/archives/2003/10/police_begin_cr.html

⁶⁶ <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/lpd03.pdf>

analysis capabilities of the SPD Crime Information Center to determine the “hottest” RD for a given time period (note: while most high-activity violent crime areas tend to be persistently high over time, they often experience short-term fluctuations). The “hottest” area would receive increased police presence via the Impact Team and, as available, other specialized units until violence subsided. The Impact Team would then move to the next “hot” area. In essence, the Impact Team would operate on a rotating, need-defined basis. Currently, the SPD’s weekly POPCOM meetings set weekly priorities for the Impact Teams and the other police department resources. This meeting should remain the weekly mechanism to determine priorities and to hold supervisors accountable for crime prevention performance.

Ongoing attention, maintenance, and enhancement of any short-term violence reduction gains generated by the Impact Team would be the responsibility of the District Commander and the CPOs assigned to the targeted RDs. As the violent crime analysis conducted in this reported documented, violent crime is not evenly spread across a single hot RD. Violence clusters at very specific addresses and locations (Figure 8). If the CPOs were able to keep these smaller areas quiet, violent crime for the entire RD would be reduced. For example, in the Valley Oak hot RD area, robberies cluster on the border of RD 345 and RD 346. In RD 346, aggravated assaults cluster in area of Albany and Astor. Problem-oriented policing would be a useful framework to understand the dynamics of the high-crime areas and launch appropriate interventions.⁶⁷ Community-oriented policing strategies could also be used to gain citizen input on the nature of area problems, citizen involvement in crime prevention strategies, and improve police-

⁶⁷ Goldstein, H. (1990) *Problem-Oriented Policing*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press; Eck, J. and Spelman, W. (1987) *Problem-Solving: Problem-Oriented Policing in Newport News*. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum.

community relations in the neighborhood.⁶⁸ Hot spot areas, such as Kentfield, would certainly benefit from community engagement and the removal of disorderly conditions.⁶⁹

Recommendation 2: Until additional officers are hired, the City of Stockton should appropriate funds to maintain the hot spots policing program at its original levels.

Recommendation 3: The Stockton Police Department should continue to focus on hot RDs by maintaining an increased presence and community problem-oriented policing. Until additional funds are available or additional officers are hired, a deployment plan needs to be developed that maximizes the ability of Stockton Police officers to maintain short-term crime prevention gains in targeted neighborhoods.

Reducing Violent Gang Offending

Street gangs generate a disproportionate amount of violent crime in Stockton. If the SPD could reduce violent gang offending, they could reduce overall levels of violent crime. Some 2,600 gang members in 40 active street gangs, representing less than one percent of the population, account for more than half of arrested homicide offenders, more than one-third of the arrested gun offenders, and 13 percent of the arrested robbery offenders. Gang-related motives account for nearly 30 percent of homicide incidents, and more than one-third of victims are gang members. Indeed, today's offenders are often tomorrow's victims and vice versa. Many Stockton gang members who are perpetrators and victims of homicide have lengthy criminal records and are well-known to the criminal justice system. The continuing involvement of these individuals in illegal behavior makes them vulnerable to focused efforts by law enforcement agencies.

The SPD currently has two specialized units that focus on violent street gangs: the Gang Street Enforcement Team (GSET) and the Gang Violence Suppression Unit

⁶⁸ Skogan, W. and Hartnett, S. (1997) *Community Policing, Chicago Style*. New York: Oxford University Press.

⁶⁹ Buki (2006).

(GVSU). GSET, comprising two uniformed sergeants and 8 uniformed officers, responds to violence with intensive ongoing enforcement efforts. GSET officers patrol gang areas in marked cruisers and target any illegal behavior by active violent gang members. This includes anything from driving without a license or registration, to drinking in public, to selling drugs. GSET was a key factor in Stockton's successful efforts to prevent gang-related youth homicides in the late 1990s.⁷⁰ GVSU, comprising one sergeant, three gang officers, one firearms investigator, and one gang graffiti investigator, addresses the crime generated by gang members through engaging a diverse set of duties and responsibilities including: gathering and recording street gang intelligence, identifying and validating street gangs and street gang members, expert testimony, in-house and community training on gangs, conducting investigations of gang crime, developing proactive enforcement missions against gang activity, parole and probation sweeps, locating victims and witnesses, and other related tasks.

Focus group sessions with members of GVSU and GSET revealed line-level concerns over their ability to proactively prevent gang violence before it occurs and disrupt ongoing cycles of retribution. GSET officers desired flexibility to adjust their tactics as appropriate. For example, certain street gangs have adapted to the high-visibility patrol strategy by engaging concealment tactics such as loitering in private garages and shutting garage doors as soon as GSET units are detected in the area. These concealment tactics make it difficult to maintain aggressive enforcement efforts on illegal street activity. In these situations, plainclothes and unmarked cars would allow officers to approach gang members without being immediately detected. While GVSU

⁷⁰ Wakeling, S. (2003) Ending Gang Homicide: Deterrence Can Work. *Perspectives on Violence Prevention*, No. 1. Sacramento, CA: California Attorney General's Office and California Health and Human Service Agency.

investigators enjoy their diversity of duties and responsibilities, they spend a large amount of time apprehending gang members wanted on warrants for the detective bureau and are generally spread thinly across a wide range of tasks. In particular, GVSU investigators are not able to spend enough time developing intelligence on gang activity and working proactively to prevent gang violence.

The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention recommend a blended approach to gang violence prevention.⁷¹ This typology includes five broad strategies: suppression, social intervention, social opportunities provision, organizational change, and community mobilization. Suppression strategies assume that most gangs are criminal associations that must be attacked through efficient gang tracking, identification, and target enforcement. Social intervention strategies encompass social service agency-based and detached gang streetworker programs that focus on emergency intervention, particularly in response to acts of violence or personal need. Opportunity provision strategies attempt to offer gang members legitimate opportunities and means to success that are at least as appealing as illegitimate options. Strategies that concentrate on organizational change typically develop intra-agency and interagency working groups to address gang problems through consensus building and coordinated action, as well as capacity building within the police department. Community organization strategies to cope with gang problems include attempts to create community solidarity, networking, education, and involvement.

As will be discussed further below, the SPD has a history of adopting a blended approach to gang violence problems and, while key elements of the approach have

⁷¹ Decker, S. and Curry, G.D. (2000) Responding to Gangs: Does the Dose Match the Problem? In Sheley, J. (ed.), *Criminology*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

diminished over time, key partnerships remain with federal authorities, probation and parole, and community-based groups.⁷² It is not unusual for interagency partnerships to diminish over time as money, time, and other scarce resources are diverted to new problems. After initial success, blended gang violence prevention approaches have waned in Baltimore, Boston, Minneapolis, and San Francisco.⁷³ The GSET and GVSU units need to refocus on preventing outbreaks of violence by engaging a more balanced approach to gang violence reduction and revitalizing partnerships with other agencies. A key part of engaging a balanced approach involves intelligence gathering and strategic analyses of crime information. Enhanced data collection and analysis will more appropriately focus enforcement, intervention, and prevention activities on times and places where gang-related violence are concentrated and individuals and groups who are at immediate high-risk of committing violence or becoming the victims of violence. Given the rapid influx of new residents, and new criminally active individuals and groups (such as Kumi Nation), an enhanced intelligence and analysis function seems critical to improving the performance of the SPD's response to gang members.

Like many specialized units in the SPD, GSET and GVSU are understaffed. Given the concentration of violence among gang members, the ability of these units to deliver meaningful responses to outbreaks of violence is key in reducing overall violent crime levels in Stockton. If additional funds are available or as additional officers are hired, the SPD should consider enlarging the number of officers focusing on preventing gang crime. In the short term, the SPD may consider combining the GSET and GVSU

⁷² Wakeling (2003)

⁷³ Braga, A. and Winship, C. (2006) Partnership, Accountability, and Innovation: Clarifying Boston's Experience with Pulling Levers. In Weisburd, D. and Braga, A. (eds.), *Police Innovation: Contrasting Perspectives*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

into one gang unit that focuses on engaging a blended approach to violence prevention. In this unit, three officers should be dedicated to collecting and analyzing intelligence and crime data for each set of ethnic gang rivalries (Asian, Hispanic, and African-American gangs). Gang unit prevention efforts should be guided by real-time analyses of violent crime problems.

Recommendation 4: The number of officers dedicated to preventing gang violence should be expanded. In the short term, the SPD may want to consider combining the GVSU and GSET units. The mission of the gang unit should more closely adhere to an approach that combines enforcement, prevention, and intervention activities to proactively prevent gang violence. Collecting and analyzing intelligence and crime data must be an important component of gang violence prevention efforts.

Operation Peacekeeper and the “Pulling Levers” Strategy

A number of jurisdictions have been experimenting with new problem-solving frameworks to prevent gang and group-involved violence. These new strategic approaches have shown promising results in the reduction of violence. Pioneered in Boston, these new initiatives have followed a core set of activities to reduce violence. These activities have included the “pulling levers” focused deterrence strategy, designed to prevent violence by and amongst chronic offenders and groups of chronic offenders; the convening of an interagency working group representing a wide range of criminal justice and social service capabilities; and jurisdiction-specific assessments of violence dynamics, perpetrator and victim characteristics, and related issues such as drug market characteristics and patterns of weapons use and acquisition: all facilitated by a close, more or less real-time partnership between researchers and practitioners.⁷⁴

⁷⁴ Braga et al. (2002).

The Boston Gun Project proceeded by: 1) assembling an interagency working group of largely line-level criminal justice and other practitioners; 2) applying quantitative and qualitative research techniques to create an assessment of the nature of, and dynamics driving, youth violence in Boston; 3) developing an intervention designed to have a substantial, near-term impact on youth homicide; 4) implementing and adapting the intervention; and 5) evaluating the intervention's impact.⁷⁵ The Project began in early 1995 and implemented what is now known as the "Operation Ceasefire" intervention, which began in the late spring of 1996. The working group of law enforcement personnel, youth workers, and researchers diagnosed the youth violence problem in Boston as one of patterned, largely vendetta-like ("beef") hostility amongst a small population of chronically criminal offenders, and particularly amongst those involved in some 60 loose, informal, mostly neighborhood-based groups (these groups were called "gangs" in Boston, but were not Chicago- or LA-style gangs).

The Operation Ceasefire "pulling levers" strategy was designed to deter by reaching out directly to gangs, saying explicitly that violence would no longer be tolerated, and backing up that message by "pulling every lever" legally available when violence occurred.⁷⁶ Simultaneously, youth workers, probation and parole officers, and later churches and other community groups offered gang members services and other kinds of help. The Ceasefire Working Group delivered this message in formal meetings with gang members, through individual police and probation contacts with gang members, through meetings with inmates of secure juvenile facilities in the city, and through gang outreach workers. The deterrence message was not a deal with gang

⁷⁵ Kennedy, Piehl, and Braga (1996).

⁷⁶ Kennedy, D. (1997) Pulling Levers: Chronic Offenders, High-Crime Settings, and a Theory of Prevention. *Valparaiso University Law Review*, Vol. 31, pp. 449- 484.

members to stop violence. Rather, it was a promise to gang members that violent behavior would evoke an immediate and intense response. If gangs committed other crimes but refrained from violence, the normal workings of police, prosecutors, and the rest of the criminal justice system dealt with these matters. But if gang members hurt people, the Working Group focused its enforcement actions on them.

A large reduction in the yearly number of Boston youth homicides followed immediately after Operation Ceasefire was implemented in mid-1996. A formal evaluation of Operation Ceasefire revealed that the intervention was associated with a 63 percent decrease in monthly number of Boston youth homicides, a 32 percent decrease in monthly number of shots-fired calls, a 25 percent decrease in monthly number of gun assaults, and, in one high-risk police district given special attention in the evaluation, a 44 percent decrease in monthly number of youth gun assault incidents.⁷⁷ Using similar approaches, other jurisdictions, including Lowell (MA), Los Angeles, and Baltimore, have experienced rapid decreases in gang and group-related violence.⁷⁸

In Stockton, Operation Peacekeeper was developed based on some of the key insights of the Boston experience.⁷⁹ With the actions of GSET, Peacekeeper was associated with a large reduction in gang-related homicides between 1997 and 1998.⁸⁰ Although Peacekeeper was a problem-oriented policing project centered on law enforcement interventions, the multidimensional and complex activities of the program fall within the five strategies of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency

⁷⁷ Braga, A., Kennedy, D., Waring, E., and Piehl, A. (2001) Problem-Oriented Policing, Deterrence, and Youth Violence: An Evaluation of Boston's Operation Ceasefire. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, Vol. 38, pp. 195 – 225.

⁷⁸ Braga et al. (2002).

⁷⁹ Wakeling (2003).

⁸⁰ Braga et al. (2002); Wakeling (2003).

Prevention's Comprehensive Gang Model: (1) community mobilization, (2) opportunity provision, (3) social intervention, (4) suppression, and (5) organizational change and development. The key elements of Peacekeeper included:⁸¹

- Step 1. Assemble an interagency partnership including municipal, county, state, and federal law enforcement agencies, community groups, and public social service agencies providing outreach service to youth at risk of gang violence.
- Step 2. Analyze the youth violence problem and use the results in designing the particulars of the local approach.
- Step 3. Directly and repeatedly communicate the message about violence and its consequences to active gangs and gangs not currently active but “at risk” of violence.
- Step 4. Respond to those gang members and gangs that don't get the message about violence with a well-coordinated, intensive law enforcement effort – and keep the pressure on until the violence stops.
- Step 5. Provide at-risk youth and their families with referrals to community centers, job programs, after school programs, and social services that provide a range of constructive alternatives to violence.

Based on the analyses in this report, Operation Peacekeeper remains a salient response to gang violence in Stockton. Unfortunately, like other cities, the initiative has diminished and needs to be revitalized. A reinvigorated Peacekeeper initiative should maintain the key elements of its earlier incarnation. However, as urban gang problems and operational capacities of key agencies evolve over time, the Peacekeeper response

⁸¹ These points were taken from Wakeling (2003), p. 6.

may need some adjustment. Nevertheless, the SPD seems well positioned to strengthen the initiative and should proceed by convening an interagency working group to discuss current gang problems and plan new Peacekeeper interventions. The working group should continue to meet on a regular basis to share information and to develop, implement, and monitor violence prevention plans.

The Peacekeeper initiative will need the support of additional gang outreach workers. As described earlier, the number of gang outreach workers has dwindled to one staff member. One person is simply not enough to deal with the varied issues of gang-involved youth and their families in Stockton. Clearly, the “street level” social service provision component of Peacekeeper needs to be strengthened. There should be at least three gang outreach workers to provide services and opportunities to gang members within each set of ethnic gang rivalries (Asian, African-American, and Hispanic).

Recommendation 5: The Operation Peacekeeper initiative must be reinvigorated.

Recommendation 6: The City of Stockton needs to hire additional gang outreach workers to provide gang-involved youth and their families with opportunities and services.

Table 1. Weapon Types and Clearances of Stockton Homicide Incidents, 2004 - 2005

N = 84

<u>Weapon Used</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Firearm	50	59.5
Knife / sharp instrument	16	19.0
Blunt instrument / hands and feet	14	16.7
Other	4	4.8
Cleared by arrest, warrant, or exceptional circumstances	48	57.1

Table 2. Characteristics of Stockton Homicide Victims and Homicide Offenders, 2004 - 2005

<u>Characteristic</u>	<u>Offenders</u>	<u>Victims</u>
Number	80	84
Male	92.5%	86.9%
White	6.3%	10.7%
Black	30.0%	35.7%
Hispanic	33.8%	38.1%
Asian	28.8%	14.3%
Other	1.1%	1.2%
17 and under	17.5%	9.5%
18 – 24	41.3%	28.6%
25 and older	41.2%	61.9%
Minimum age	13	<1
Maximum age	74	85
Mean age	26.5	32.3
Gang member	52.5%	36.9%

Table 3. Prior Criminal Histories and Criminal Justice System Involvement of Stockton Homicide Victims and Homicide Offenders, 2005

	<u>Offenders</u>	<u>Victims</u>	<u>Gang Offenders</u>	<u>Gang Victims</u>
Total Number	34	43	20	17
Known to the CJ System	61.8%	69.8%	70%	94.1%
Known individuals	21	30	14	16
Active probation supervision	33.3%	43.3%	35.7%	50.0%
Prior probation supervision	61.9%	70.0%	57.1%	75.0%
Committed to secure facility	38.1%	56.7%	28.6%	50.0%
Convicted felon	33.3%	53.3%	35.7%	56.3%
Prior armed violent crime	42.9%	36.7%	57.1%	43.8%
Prior unarmed violent crime	38.1%	43.3%	50.0%	43.8%
Prior property crime	76.2%	66.7%	78.6%	56.3%
Prior drug crime	42.9%	50.0%	42.9%	56.3%
Prior nonviolent gun crime	42.9%	26.7%	42.9%	37.5%
Prior disorder offense	66.7%	86.7%	71.4%	93.8%
Mean prior crimes	7.3	10.6	7.0	9.0

Table 4. Circumstances of Stockton Homicide Incidents, 2004 - 2005

N = 77 (91.7% of 84 total homicide incidents)

<u>Circumstance</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Personal dispute	19	24.7
Gang-related	17	22.1
Gang and drug-related	5	6.5
Drug-related dispute	6	7.8
Drug robbery	4	5.2
Robbery	12	15.6
Domestic / family violence	13	16.9
Other	1	1.3

Table 5. Stockton Police Department Arrested Offenders, 2004 – 2005

	<u>Gun Assault</u>	<u>Robbery</u>	<u>Rape</u>
Number	147	882	73
Male	93.2%	83.6%	100%
17 and under	22.6%	27.8%	20.5%
18 – 24	48.6%	39.7%	23.3%
25 and older	28.8%	32.5%	56.2%
White	6.2%	11.6%	12.3%
Black	29.4%	48.2%	31.5%
Hispanic	35.6%	33.1%	47.9%
Asian	24.0%	6.0%	6.8%
Other	4.8%	1.1%	1.4%
Gang member	33.6%	12.9%	2.6%

Note: There were 153 gun assault offenders arrested in 2004 and 2005. However, 6 were missing information for sex, age, and race. These individuals were excluded from the above table.

Table 6. Distribution of Estimated Membership of Stockton Gangs

N= 40 gangs

<u>Number of Members</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Percent</u>
10 or less	6	15.0
11 – 25	9	22.5
26 – 50	12	30.0
51 – 100	5	12.5
101 – 250	7	17.5
251 or greater	1	2.5

Table 7.Weapon Used in Robbery in Stockton, 2004 -2005

N = 2539

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Strong arm	1303	51.3
Firearm	774	30.5
Other dangerous weapon	241	9.5
Knife or cutting instrument	221	8.7

Weapon Used in Aggravated Assault in Stockton, 2004 -2005

N = 4239

<u>Weapon</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Hands and feet	1659	39.1
Other dangerous weapon	1489	35.1
Firearm	619	14.6
Knife or cutting instrument	472	11.1

Table 8. Type of Robbery in Stockton, 2004 -2005

N = 2539

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Street	1038	40.9
Commercial business	325	12.8
Convenience store	288	11.3
Apartment	162	6.4
Residence	133	5.2
Service station	54	2.1
Bank / savings & loan	33	1.3
School	18	0.7
Other	488	19.2

Table 9. The Concentration of Violent Crime in SPD Reporting District Areas

<u>Robbery Type</u>	<u>Top IRDs</u>	<u>% 237 RDs</u>	<u>% Total Robbery Type</u>
Bank / Savings & loan	8	3.4%	60.6% (20 of 33)
Service station	9	3.8%	53.7% (29 of 54)
Commercial business	10	4.2%	36.0% (117 of 325)
Apartment / residence	14	5.9%	34.9% (103 of 295)
Street	10	4.2%	31.1% (323 of 1038)
Convenience store	11	4.6%	29.2% (84 of 288)
Total robbery	11	4.6%	21.9% (556 of 2539)
<u>Aggravated Assault Type</u>	<u>Top IRDs</u>	<u>% 237 RDs</u>	<u>% Total Assault Type</u>
Firearm	12	5.1%	30.4% (188 of 619)
Knife or cutting instrument	11	4.6%	26.7% (126 of 472)
Hands and feet	12	5.1%	18.8% (312 of 1659)
Total aggravated assault	12	5.1%	20.0% (848 of 4239)
<u>Violent Crime Type</u>	<u>Top IRDs</u>	<u>% 237 RDs</u>	<u>% Total Violent Crime Type</u>
Homicide	16	6.8%	53.4% (36 of 73)
Total violent crime	10	4.2%	17.1% (1212 of 7078)
	15	6.3%	23.6% (1670 of 7078)
	23	9.7%	34.3% (2427 of 7078)

Table 10. Top Violent Crime Reporting Districts Identified

<u>Total Violent Crime</u>		<u>Homicide</u>		<u>Total Robbery</u>		<u>Total Agg. Assault</u>	
<u>RD</u>	<u>Count</u>	<u>RD</u>	<u>Count</u>	<u>RD</u>	<u>Count</u>	<u>RD</u>	<u>Count</u>
122	160	231	5	106	68	326	106
326	160	122	3	122	65	122	83
253	126	306	2	180	54	346	81
106	125	281	2	326	51	344	76
346	120	253	2	102	51	253	74
102	111	219	2	103	48	345	71
103	108	218	2	128	48	216	66
345	103	216	2	129	46	281	62
218	102	207	2	218	45	325	61
107	97	191	2	253	40	102	56
281	93	136	2	264	40	103	56
325	93	129	2			107	56
117	91	124	2				
129	91	117	2				
344	90	107	2				
180	89						
216	88						
128	86						
219	84						
115	80						
231	80						
252	80						
339	80						

<u>Firearm Agg. Assault</u>		<u>Knife Agg. Assault</u>		<u>HFF Agg. Assault</u>	
<u>RD</u>	<u>Count</u>	<u>RD</u>	<u>Count</u>	<u>RD</u>	<u>Count</u>
344	24	218	14	122	34
345	24	128	13	326	33
326	23	122	12	102	28
325	19	216	12	117	26
216	15	346	12	252	26
346	14	326	11	344	25
107	12	117	11	103	24
253	12	129	11	281	24
306	12	102	10	346	23
322	11	106	10	306	23
281	11	107	10	253	23
219	11			216	23

<u>Bank / S&L Robbery</u>		<u>Com. Busin. Robbery</u>		<u>Conv. Store Robbery</u>		<u>Service Station Robbery</u>	
<u>RD</u>	<u>Count</u>	<u>RD</u>	<u>Count</u>	<u>RD</u>	<u>Count</u>	<u>RD</u>	<u>Count</u>
338	4	180	19	324	10	221	6
288	3	264	18	180	9	129	5
102	3	334	15	166	8	208	4
262	2	277	14	178	8	276	4
281	2	360	9	364	7	110	2
328	2	127	9	311	7	147	2
346	2	358	9	281	7	164	2
437	2	323	8	147	7	180	2
		330	8	158	7	189	2
		345	8	204	7		
				207	7		

<u>Apt. / Resid. Robbery</u>		<u>Street Robbery</u>	
<u>RD</u>	<u>Count</u>	<u>RD</u>	<u>Count</u>
115	15	106	59
326	14	122	41
221	10	102	33
103	8	128	32
253	7	103	30
325	7	107	28
282	6	129	27
266	6	192	26
122	5	218	25
178	5	123	22
218	5		
219	5		
226	5		
359	5		

Table 12. Clearance Rates by Stockton Police Department and Other California Law Enforcement Agencies, 2004

<u>Crime</u>	<u>State</u>	<u>Stockton</u>
Homicide	54.9%	59.5%
Robbery	26.1%	27.4%
Aggravated Assault	57.7%	49.7%
Burglary	12.6%	14.5%
Auto Theft	9.4%	13.3%

Source: California Department of Justice and Stockton Police Department

Figure 1.

Violent Crime Rate per 100,000 Population in Stockton, California 1985 - 2005

Source: FBI Uniform Crime Reports 1985 - 2004, Stockton Police Department 2005




Figure 2.




Figure 3.




Figure 4.




Figure 5.

Stockton Gun Assault Incidents 1992 - 2005

Source: Stockton Police Department




Figure 6.




Figure 7.




Figure 8.

