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8	City of Stockton		
9	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT		
10	EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA		
11	SACRAMENTO DIVISION		N
12			
13	In re:	Case No	. 2012-32118
14	CITY OF STOCKTON, CALIFORNIA,	D.C. No	. OHS-15
15	Debtor.	Chapter	9
16			REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL IN SUPPORT OF CITY'S
17		SUPPLE	MENTAL REPLY BRIEF IN T OF CONFIRMATION OF
18		THE FIR	ST AMENDED PLAN OF MENT, AS MODIFIED
19			T 8, 2014)
20		Date: Time:	October 1, 2014 10:00 a.m.
21		Dept: Judge:	Courtroom 35 Hon. Christopher M. Klein
22		Judge.	Hon. Christopher W. Klein
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28			WAS DECLIFED BY THE STATE OF TH

CITY'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE ISO SUPL.
REPLY BRIEF ISO CONFIRMATION OF PLAN OF
ADJUSTMENT

Case 12-32118 Filed 09/18/14 Doc 1713

1	Pursuant to Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the City of Stockton (the "City")
2	respectfully requests that the Court take judicial notice of the document attached as Exhibit A,
3	excerpts from the certified September 3, 2014, 8:30 a.m. transcript of the Detroit confirmation
4	hearing, In re City of Detroit Michigan, Case. No. 13-53846 (SWR) (Bankr. E.D. Mich.).
5	The timing of this request is proper. Under Rule 201(d), "[t]he court may take judicial
5	notice at any stage of the proceeding." Fed. R. Evid. 201(d); In re Int'l Bldg. Components, 159
7	B.R. 173, 180 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1993) ("In a non-jury trial, judicial notice may be taken at any
3	time prior to the decision ") (citation omitted).
9	Further, Exhibit A, an oral argument transcript, is properly subject to judicial notice
0	because its contents "can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy
1	cannot reasonably be questioned." Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2); Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air
2	Quality Mgmt. Dist., 498 F.3d 1031, 1039 n.2 (9th Cir. 2007) (granting a request for judicial
3	notice of an oral argument transcript); Elder-Evins v. Casey, No. C 09-06776 SBA LB, 2012 WL
4	2577589, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 3, 2012) ("[C]ourts regularly take judicial notice, under Rule 201,
5	of oral argument transcripts from other courts [because they meet the requirement of Fed. R.
6	Evid. 201(b)(2)].") (citations omitted). According to the docket in the Detroit matter, "the
7	transcript may be viewed at the Clerk's Office by parties who do not receive electronic notice and
8	participated in the proceeding," and is available for purchase from a court transcriber whose
9	contact information is listed in the docket. In re City of Detroit, Michigan, Dkt. No. 7345. The
0	City requests that the Court take judicial notice of the fact that the transcript contains certain
1	statements cited in the Reply, concurrently filed.
2	///
3	///
4	///
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7	¹ The City has attached only the pages cited in the City's Supplemental Reply Brief In Support Of Confirmation Of The First Amended Plan Of Adjustment, As Modified (August 8, 2014) ("Reply") along with surrounding pages for
- 1	j , (""") (<u>""") </u>

CITY'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE ISO SUPL.
REPLY BRIEF ISO CONFIRMATION OF PLAN OF
ADJUSTMENT

context as necessary.

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1	For the foregoing reasons, the City respectfully requests that the Court take judicial notice	
2	of the document attached as Exhibit A.	
3		
4	Dated: September 18, 2014	MARC A. LEVINSON
5		NORMAN C. HILE PATRICK B. BOCASH
6		Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP
7		
8		By: /s/ Marc A. Levinson MARC A. LEVINSON
9		Attorneys for Debtor City of Stockton
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,	Case 12-32118 Filed 09/18/14 Doc 1713	
	Exhibit A	

Case 12-32118 Filed 09/18/14 Doc 1713

1	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT		
2		EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION	
3	IN THE MATTER OF,	Case No. 13-53846 Detroit, Michigan	
4	CITY OF DETROIT, MI	September 3, 2014 8:30 a.m.	
5			
6	IN RE: TRIAL BEFORE THE HONORABLE STEVEN W. RHODES TRANSCRIPT ORDERED BY: <u>ROBIN WYSOCKI</u>		
7	APPEARANCES:		
8	For the City of Detroit, MI:	RDIICE RENNETT ESO	
9	ror the city or betroit, Mr.	Jones, Day	
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13	Arts Museum:	Honigman, Miller, Schwartz & Cohn	
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16	For the Official Committee:	SAM ALBERTS, ESQ.	
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23	For Financial Guaranty Insurance Company:	ALFREDO R. PEREZ, ESQ. Weil, Gotshal & Manges	
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9	(By Phone)	Drinker, Biddle & Reath 1500 K Street, N.W.
10		Suite 1100 Washington, District of
11		Columbia 202-842-8800
12	For Oakland County:	JAYE QUADROZZI, ESQ. (P71646)
13		Young & Associates 27725 Stansbury Boulevard
14		Suite 125 Farmington Hills, MI 48334
15		248-353-8620
16	PRESENT:	KEITH LERMINIAUX, ESQ.
	Court Recorder:	Kristel Trionfi
17		LaShonda Moss
18	Transcriber:	Deborah L. Kremlick
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21	produced by transcription serv	ice.
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(Court in Session)

THE CLERK: All rise. Court is in session. Please be seated. Calling case number 13-53846, City of Detroit, Michigan.

THE COURT: Good morning. I think rather than take the time to take appearances, we'll just assume everyone's here. Raise your hand if you're not here. Mr. Bennett.

MR. BENNETT: Thank you, Your Honor. Bruce Bennett of Jones, Day on behalf of the City of Detroit.

Where we left off yesterday we were discussing the best interest test. And in particular whether the city had any ability to raise taxes and thereby generate more revenue as opposed to harm itself by either continuing the downward spiral that the city is already in, or making that situation worse.

And then immediately when we left I was talking about the fact that there's a competitive -- in addition to the cases that talk about avoiding downward spirals, and I think necessarily by the need to address downward spirals, there is a competitive dimension that a municipality has to worry about and that the Court has to worry about for a city that's in a challenging position relative to its tax rates being charged to residents and the services that are -- that it's providing. That's just reality.

And as a result of these what I'll call facts on the

ground, or the here and now, as opposed to projections and speculations and the so-called dismissal analysis. The city's debt can demonstrate, and I think will demonstrate quite easily during the trial but it also, I'd point out, has demonstrated as a result of the facts found at the eligibility hearing a little bit more than a year ago, or excuse me, a little less than a year ago, that the city — that the city does satisfy the best interest test even though it's not in a position to raise taxes and doesn't pay taxes.

Now there's another dimension to the best interest test.

And it's the comparison to alternatives. And the alternative of course in a Chapter 9 case is dismissal.

And here again one of my themes is going to be we know an awful lot about what a dismissal scenario is going to look like for the city again, based on facts that have already been found, or facts that we can find by looking around us. And we don't need to guess about the future and project about the future, or gaze into crystal balls to the side that dismissal is not a satisfactory alternative.

And again I want to remind the Court that the relevant standard is not whether someone can conjure up -- some creditor can conjure up a particularly rosy scenario for that creditor as to how that creditor might navigate what I will describe as a very disordered orderly process and somehow come out the other end doing better than it would do under the plan

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and doing better than everyone else. That's not the test in Chapter 9. The test in Chapter 9 for best interest looks at the creditor body as a whole.

So one of the things that we established earlier, I don't think it's subject to dispute, is that the city can't raise taxes itself. It's at the limits or very very close to the limits of the taxes it is authorized to levy by the State of Michigan.

Only Courts can raise taxes through the application of the Judicature Act and it's only the property tax that can be raised through -- by creditors through exercising that creditor remedy with a Court order.

And if the city again, if we succeed in showing, if we haven't shown -- if we -- as we have shown already, that the city is in a downward spiral now. Dismissal followed by increased taxes will only mean that the downward spiral will continue or get worse.

And if that's the case, again as the cases demonstrate, I don't think we need to -- to develop a forecast or speculate about it. The city is going to be even less able to generate revenue. It's going to -- it's going to lose more residents. It's going to lose more businesses. It may well have more delinquency problems. And that's going to make the entire situation worse, not only for the residents that are still here, it will make the situation worse for creditors as well.

resolved because the case never got far enough. But I think
Your Honor heard that there was a good deal of significant
issue concerning how -- how collections had been accounted for
and allocated to different assessments with respect to bills

that hadn't been completely paid.

And there is going to be, if that case didn't get resolved, a -- a -- a -- one component of that larger dispute was going to be figuring out exactly how much was collected on account of different assessments and circumstances where bills were partially paid. A nightmare I am glad that we avoided here, but would not be avoided in dismissal.

So our conclusion again from facts that we know, from experience here, from things we know about this case and the positions of creditors, not guesses about what they might be, what we saw what they are, whether there is a race to a courthouse or courthouses, or mob scenes at courthouses, there is not going to be a single line where everybody agrees what their rights are and settles for some form of treatment arising out of a pro rata assessment as to which no one expects it will be fully paid and where the allocation scheme where partial payments occur, is not yet clear under the law.

That Your Honor, is a mess. And it is a further demonstration that the -- that a dismissal scenario is not good for creditors generally. I will go further to say I don't think dismissal is good for any creditor. But as I

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indicated before, Chapter 9 very clearly states that the test relates to creditors generally.

We will of course have more evidence on dismissal. again I want to -- want to say that I think that in terms of the record already established in this case, the -- we may well, the city may well have already demonstrated and the facts as they have developed in this case, may already have demonstrated that dismissal is not a satisfactory alternative for this debtor for which out of Court negotiations were impossible or impracticable and as to which judicial machinery that would apply wouldn't help make that more orderly very much.

My last point with respect to this section is to return to the FGIC argument that all this might be okay because by creating liens pursuant to the Judicature Act on -- or not liens, I'm sorry, assessments pursuant to the Judicature Act and raising taxes would create such an uncomfortable situation for the city that it would then change its mind and sell DIA assets if it can to one of their preferred bidders as opposed to pursuant to the grand bargain and the DIA settlement.

And -- and I would submit to the Court that that is a completely inappropriate argument, it is an improper use of the law, and an objective that this Court shouldn't tolerate and would not change the outcome of the best interest test.

There's one more point in the best interest category that

We certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter. /s/Deborah L. Kremlick, CER-4872 Dated: 9-8-14 Kristel Trionfi LaShonda Moss